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S. H. BENNION, 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
SHELL OIL COMPANY, a 
Delaware corporation, and 
UTAH STATE BOARD OF OIL, 
GAS AND MINING, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
SHELL OIL COMPANY 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 18345 
Plaintiff-appellant S. H. Bennion appeals from a judg-
ment of the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, 
the Honorable James S. Sawaya presiding, affirming an order of 
the Utah State Board of Oil, Gas and Mining concerning Mr. 
Bennion's right to share in production from a well operated by 
respondent Shell Oil Company (hereinafter "Shell"). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
S. H. Bennion commenced this action in the District 
Court on June 10, 1981, seeking review of an order of the Utah 
State Board of Oil, Gas and Mining issued on April 30, 1981. 
(R.2). In August 1981, Bennion filed a motion for summary 
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judgment asserting in effect that the order of the Board should 
be reversed as a matter of law. (R. 110). In November 1981, 
Shell moved for summary judgment contending that the Board's 
order should be affirmed as a matter of law. (R. 137). On 
December 29, 1981, the parties presented oral argument on their 
respective motions (R. 183 et seq.), after which the District 
Court took the case under advisement. On March 8, 1982, the 
District Court entered its Judgment and Order of Dismissal 
granting Shell's motion, denying Bennion's motion, and affirm-
ing the order of the Board in its entirety. (R. 172) On March 
23, 1982, Bennion filed his notice of this appeal. (R. 177). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Shell seeks an order of the Court affirming the judg-
ment of the District Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts in Bennion's brief is incom-
plete in certain respects and misleading in others. The fol-
lowing, therefore, is a summary of all of the pertinent facts 
established in the administrative record and in proceedings 
before the District Court. 
I. THE DRILLING UNIT AND COMMENCEMENT 
OF THE TEW-1B5 WELL 
On June 24, 1971, the Board ordered that Section 1, 
Township 2 South, Range 5 West, Uintah Special Meridian, be 
established as an oil and gas drilling unit. The order, as 
-2-
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amended in 1972, authorized the drilling of one well on the 
drilling unit.* S. H. Bennion owns an undivided 25 percent 
mineral interest in one eighth of the section; .his interests 
extend to 2.94898 percent of the entire unit. The remaining 
working interests in the unit are owned or leased by seven 
individuals or corporations, including Shell. In June 1973, 
Shell notified all seven other working interest owners, includ-
ing Bennion, that it proposed to drill a well in the unit. 
(Shell Ex. l).** In December 1973, Shell sent to all of the 
working interest owners a proposed operating agreement. (Shell 
Ex. F). This operating agreement, prepared on a standard form 
in common use in the area, named Shell as operator and provided 
for the sharing of expenses and proceeds, if any, from the well 
to be drilled. 
* The Board's orders were entered in Cause No. 139-3. Sub-
sections (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) of section 40-6-6, Utah 
Code Ann. (1982 Repl. Vol.), authorize the Board to establish 
drilling units so as to prevent waste of oil or gas, to avoid 
the drilling of unnecessary wells, or to protect correlative 
rights. The size and shape of such units is to approximate 
"the maximum area that can be efficiently and economically 
drained by one well." The drilling of any well in the unit 
other than the one authorized by the order is unlawful. 
** References in this brief to exhibits, letters, orders or 
transcripts are all to portions of the administrative record 
certified by the Board to the District Court. The documents in 
the administrative record are neither indexed nor numbered. 
They are contained in two large envelopes on file in the office 
of the Clerk of this Court. 
-3-
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Shell and six of the other working interest owners in 
the unit signed Shell's proposed operating
0
agreement, dated 
December 14, 1973. (Shell Ex. 8). The only working interest 
owner who refused to sign the agreement was Mr. Bennion, who 
advised Shell: "I don't want to become involved whatever, with 
your Company in t_his venture." (Shell Ex. 5). Shell therefore 
represented in the operating agreement that it would pay 
Bennion's share of expenses in drilling and operating the well. 
The well, which bore the designation Tew-lBS, was com-
menced on December 20, 1973, and was completed as a producer on 
July 7, 1974. The well is located on land in which Shell owns 
100 percent of the working interest. It is located more than 
one quarter mile away from any land in which Bennion owns an 
interest. In May 1976, proceeds from the well's production 
became sufficient to pay drilling and related costs; in other 
words, the well's "payout" occurred in that month. The well 
has continued production since that time. 
II. BENNION'S INITIAL APPLICATION FOR 
FORCED POOLING AND HIS NEGOTIATIONS WITH 
SHELL 
On February 24, 1975, Bennion applied to the Board for 
"forced pooling" of the unit.* After a hearing date was set 
* Subsections (g) and (h) of section 40-6-6 authorize the 
working interest owners in a unit to agree on the terms for 
sharing expenses and proceeds from a well. (Continued) 
-4-
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in Cause No. 139-13 so initiated, Bennion'~ attorney notified 
the Board that he wished an indefinite continuance. (Letter 
from S. G. Crockett to the Board dated March 18, 1975). Sev-
eral months later Mr. Bennion asked the Board to reschedule the 
hearing, but then again asked that the hearing be continued 
without date. (Letter from S. H. Bennion to the Board dated 
August 25, 1975). Over the next several years Bennion and 
Shell negotiated sporadically concerning Bennion's right to 
participate in production from the well, and the percentage of 
his interest in the unit. Bennion consistently refused to sign 
agreements proposed by Shell, and he refused to pay his share 
of costs or operating expenses on the terms to which the other 
working interest owners had agreed. Not only did he refuse to 
sign the operating agreement proposed by Shell and signed by 
the other owners. (Shell Ex. 8). He also refused to sign a 
division order proposed by Shell (Shell Ex. 7) and a one-page 
letter agreement prepared by Shell in response to his conten-
tion that the operating agreement was too long (Shell Ex. 10). 
In December 1975 Bennion tendered payment to Shell of his al-
leged share of expenditures, but the payment was conditioned 
(Note continued.) In the absence of agreement, these 
subsections authorize a "nonconsenting" owner like Bennion to 
seek an order of the Board decreeing the owner's rights in a 
share of production from the well, after the operator's 
recoupment of expenses. Such orders are called "forced 
pooling" orders. 
-5-
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upon Shell's agreement that his share in the unit was greater 
. 
than Shell -- and later the Board -- believed to be the case.* 
(Shell Ex. 14). Shell had no alternative but to refuse 
Bennion's tender. (Shell Ex. 15). 
During these negotiations, Bennion made it clear to 
Shell that he would not voluntarily participate in the payment 
of expenses until he was entitled to take what he believed to 
be his working interest percentage of production in kind from 
the date of first production. (See, ~· Shell Ex. 14). In 
short, Bennion was unwilling to accept cash payments from Shell 
for his alleged share of past production. (Tr. of Oct.24, 
1979, at 30-31). Shell consistently refused to pay Bennion in 
kind back to first production from the well because the par-
ties could not agree on Bennion's percentage interest in the 
well, and because, in Shell's view, payment in kind long after 
production started would be unfair to it and other working in-
terest owners. Shell believed that payment in kind would, in 
effect, have rewarded Bennion with dramatically increased oil 
prices even though he had refused to shoulder the risks of 
development along with Shell and the other working interest 
* Bennion contended that he owned a working interest of 3.125 
percent of the unit. Shell believed that his working interest 
amounted to 2.94898 percent. In its Order in Cause No. 139-13, 
dated April 30, 1981, the Board concluded that Bennion's inter-
est was as Shell contended. 
-6-
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owners. For these reasons, and because Shell and Bennion dis-
agreed on other matters, the two never reached an accord. 
Between September 1975 and June 1979, ·Bennion made no 
effort to bring his grievances against Shell before the Board. 
Until 1979 he made no effort to press his application for 
forced pooling of the unit. 
III. BENNION'S AMENDED APPLICATION 
AND PROCEEDINGS THEREON 
On June 7, 1979, Bennion filed an amended application 
in Cause No. 139-13, in which he again asked the Board to order 
the forced pooling of the unit, to require Shell to deliver his 
alleged share of production in kind from the date of first pro-
duction, and to require Shell to produce its records of drill-
ing costs and operating expenses. After hearings on July 26, 
1979, and October 24, 1979, the Board entered an Interim Order 
(dated October 24, 1979), requiring Shell to pay expenses for 
Bennion, his lawyer and his accountant to travel to Houston, 
Texas, to review Shell's books and records concerning produc-
tion and costs of drilling. This order was entered even though 
Shell had previously provided Bennion with complete summaries 
of revenues and expenses from the Tew-1B5 well (Bennion Ex. 
A-5, Shell Ex. 6, Shell Ex. 12), with a complete audit of the 
well conducted by Tenneco Oil Company, one of the other working 
interest owners (Shell Ex. 16 and Shell Ex. 23), and with supp-
lemental expense and revenue information requested by Bennion's 
-7-
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accountants (Shell Ex. 18). 
0 
0 
Bennion did not avail himself of the opportunity to 
examine Shell's records at Shell's expense. Rather, he engaged 
the Houston office of his own accounting firm to audit Shell's 
records. On July 9, 1980, Bennion's Houston accountants re-
ported that they had reviewed Shell's records but that they 
could not certify their audit because certain production re-
cords were not "readily" available to them and because "the 
complexity of gas plant cost accounting systems" did not just-
ify a complete review. Mr. Bennion's accountants, however, 
reached the "tentative" conclusion that Shell's accounts of 
Bennion's interest overpaid Bennion by more than $5,000. 
(Letter from Main Hurdman & Cranstoun to Peter Stirba dated 
July 9, 1980). In any event, Bennion's attorney was unable to 
offer the Board evidence indicating that Shell's records or 
summaries short-changed his account. (Tr. of Dec. 18, 1980 at 
34-35). 
On March 26, 1980, the Board entered a second interim 
order in Cause No. 139-13, this one based upon a stipulation 
between Shell and Bennion. The order stated first that all 
interests in the unit would be pooled effective July 26, 1979, 
the date of the initial hearing in Cause No. 139-13. Second, 
the order provided that Bennion would be entitled to receive 
his proportionate share of oil, gas, and other hydrocarbons 
-8-
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produced from the well in kind, but only from the effective 
date of the pooling order, and only upon Bennion's payment of 
his share of Shell's operating expenses. Third, the order pro-
vided that Shell would pay to the Board $72,222.41, which Shell 
had calculated as Bennion's share of total net revenue from the 
well from the date of first production to the effective date of 
the pooling order. (This sum was made up of (1) a cost-free 
royalty equalling one-eighth of Bennion's working interest, 
computed from first production until ''payout" in May 1976, and 
(2) a working interest share of proceeds after payout, less 
Bennion's proportionate share of expenses.) Finally, the order 
provided that it was entered without prejudice to Bennion's 
claims that he should receive more than a 2.9489 percent work-
ing interest, and that he should receive payment in kind 
(rather than in cash) for production prior to the effective 
date of the pooling order. These claims were to be addressed 
later. 
On December 18, 1980, the Board conducted its third 
and final hearing in Cause No. 139-13, following which it is-
sued the order that is the subject of this appeal. That final 
order, dated April 30, 1981, held in pertinent part that since 
Shell was willing to let Bennion share in the well's cash pro-
ceeds from first production to the effective date of the pool-
ing order, Bennion would be entitled to the $72,222.41 pre-
viously paid to the Board. But the Board held that Bennion was 
-9-
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not entitled to a share of production in kind for that 
. 
period. The Board likewise rejected Benni~n's other claims 
against Shell. 
On June 8, 1981, Bennion filed his complaint in this 
case, asking the District Court to set aside the Board's April 
30 order on the ground that it was "unreasonable, unjust, arbi-
trary, capricious, without legal or factual basis, and other-
wise constitutes an abuse of the Board's discretion.'' As noted 
above, the District Court rejected Bennion's contentions and 
affirmed the Board's last order in its entirety. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THIS COURT MAY ONLY SET ASIDE THE 
BOARD'S DISCRETIONARY DETERMINATIONS 
IF IT CONCLUDES THAT THE BOARD 
ACTED ARBITRARILY OR CAPRICIOUSLY 
This appeal raises important questions of first im-
pression concerning construction of the Oil and Gas Conserva-
tion Act, Utah Code Ann. §40-6-1 et seq. (1982 Repl. Vol.), 
together with equally important questions concerning the scope 
of the Board's discretion in matters committed to its exper-
tise. The Board exercised its discretion -- we believe soundly 
-- in holding that S. H. Bennion was not entitled to receive 
oil and gas in kind as his share of past production. (See 
Part II B of this argument.) The Board also exercised its 
sound discretion in refusing to require Shell to deliver its 
-10-
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well records to Salt Lake City. (See Part V.) Bennion seeks 
reversal of both determinations. 
In resolving the issues on appeal, therefore, the 
Court must not only construe the Act but also apply established 
standards governing review of discretionary administrative 
orders. In other words, the Court must pay the decisions of 
the Board the degree of deference usually owed to administra-
tive agencies expert in a complex regulatory field: 
"In the field of administrative law the assump-
tion is indulged that the administrator (or ad-
ministrative tribunal) possesses superior knowl-
edge and expertise because of specialized train-
ing and experience, and the focus of interest 
within the particular field. For this reason the 
well-established rule is that the courts indulge 
him considerable latitude in determinations he 
makes on questions of fact and also in the exer-
cise of his discretion with respect to the res-
ponsibilities which the law imposes upon him; and 
they will not interfere therewith unless it ap-
_ pears that he acted in excess of his powers, or 
that he so abused his discretion that his action 
was capricious or arbitrary." 
Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Brimhall, 28 Utah 2d 14, 18, 497 
P.2d 638, 641 (1972) (footnotes omitted). Accord: Beirne v. 
Mitchell, 587 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah 1978); Hardy v. State Tax 
Commission, 561 P.2d 1064, 1066 (Utah 1977); Peatross v. 
Board of Commissioners, 555 P.2d 281 (Utah 1976). 
The Board conducted three hearings in this case. It 
considered many pages of briefs submitted by the parties. The 
members of the Board brought their collective expert judgment 
-11-
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to bear on Mr. Bennion's grievances in rendering the three 
written decisions in the administrative record. Unless Bennion 
can demonstrate a violation of the Oil and Gas.,Conservation Act 
or that the Board acted arbitrarily, this Court must affirm the 
District Court's ruling. 
II. 
BENNION IS NOT ENTITLED TO PAYMENT 
OF OIL AND GAS IN KIND 
In Parts I, II and III of his brief, Bennion sets 
forth his position on the most important issue in this appeal: 
whether a mineral interest owner who refuses to enter into a 
voluntary pooling arrangement with the operator of a state-
ordered drilling unit is entitled to retroactive payment of his 
share of production in kind. Shell, of course, voluntarily 
paid Bennion his share from the date of first production in 
cash. Bennion, however, contends that section 40-6-6 of the 
Oil and Gas Conservation Act and the Utah Constitution require 
the Board to order payment in kind. 
There are two serious problems with this contention. 
First, Bennion has no statutory, constitutional or common law 
right to any payment whatsoever -- whether in cash or in kind 
-- for his presumed share of production between the date of 
first production and the effective date of the Board's pooling 
order. Second, retroactive payment to Bennion in kind would 
reward him with a windfall for refusing to take the risks borne 
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by Shell and six other working interest owners and for refusing 
to take the simple steps established by the Oil and Gas Conser-
vation Act to share in the well' s production. .If Bennion is 
right in asking for payment in kind years after the fact, then 
working interest owners will have no inducement to comply with 
the terms of the Act, and the Act itself will become a dead 
letter. 
A. Bennion Has No Right to Payment Measured 
Retroactively From the Date of the Forced 
Pooling Order 
One of the purposes of Utah's Oil and Gas Conservation 
Act was to provide a means by which mineral interest owners 
could share in oil and gas drained from their property by wells 
on adjacent property. Before the Act, mineral owners in that 
position had no judicial remedy against their neighbors. In 
other words, a neighbor who drilled a well on his own land and 
who drained the pool had just as much right to the oil as the 
person from whose property it migrated toward the well. This 
rule, known as the "rule of capture," prevailed in most juris-
dictions and presumably in Utah as well. See McKay and 
Conder, "Statutory Needs in Utah Oil and Gas Law," 1950 Utah L. 
Rev. 33, 34. See also 1 Williams & Meyers, Oil & Gas Law 
§204.4 at 55-56 (1981); Desormeaux. v. Inexco Oil Co., 298 
So.2d 897 (La. App. 1974), writ ref., 302 So.2d 37 (1974). 
"If an adjoining owner drills his own land and taps a deposit 
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of oil or gas, extending under his neighbor's field, so that it 
0 
comes into his well, it becomes his property." Brown v. 
Spillman, 155 U.S. 655, 669-70 (1895). The only remedy of the 
adjoining landowner was to drill a well on his own land to cap-
ture as much of the pool as he could. 1 Williams & Meyers, ~ 
cit., at 57. 
The Utah Oil and Gas Conservation Act changed the 
"rule of capture" to this extent: Where a spacing order or 
drilling order is entered permitting only one well on a unit 
covering separately owned parcels, the non-drilling mineral 
owner may obtain a share of the oil or gas in one of two spec-
ific ways. He may agree with the other mineral owners in the 
unit on a basis of sharing, thus voluntarily pooling the unit. 
See Utah Code Ann. §40-6-6(f) (1982 Repl. Vol.). Or he may 
petition the Board for an order compelling the pooling of all 
interests in the unit, thus force pooling the unit. See id. 
-- --
§40-6-6(f) and (g). If the mineral owner does neither, he is 
left where he was before the Oil and Gas Conservation Act, that 
is, with no rights in oil for which he has not drilled. Thus, 
the rule of capture continues to apply to any owner who neg-
lects to avail himself of the remedies in the Act. 
Although the Utah Supreme Court has never had occasion 
to consider the question, this has been the repeated conclusion 
of courts in other jurisdictions with conservation acts like 
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Utah's. See,~-, Gruger v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 135 
6 
P.2d 485, 488 (Okla. 1943) ("The law of capture ... still ob-
tains ..• except as it has been or may be regu~ated or res-
tricted under the laws passed in the exercise of the police 
power .... [Those laws] simply authorize administrative boards 
to issue orders that have the effect of regulating or abrogat-
ing in a measure the law of capture."); California Co. v. 
Britt, 154 So.2d 144, 147-48 (Miss. 1963); Anderson v. 
Ellison, 285 F.2d 484, 486 (10th Cir. 1960) ("without the 
spacing statute and the Commission's pooling order he would 
have no right to share in the oil and gas produced from the 
well."); Wood Oil Co. v. Corporation Comm'n., 239 P.2d 1023, 
1026 (Okla 1950). 
Bennion's assertion of a vested right to a share of 
production from commencement of the well simply ignores the 
rule of capture and its relation to the Oil and Gas Conserva-
tion Act. He infers from subparagraphs (g) and (h) of section 
40-6-6 of the Act that he is entitled as a matter of right to a 
share in production irrespective of any order of the Board and 
irrespective of any voluntary pooling arrangement to which he 
may agree. But these provisions refer in their entirety to the 
contents of forced pooling orders which are issued by the board 
and which become effective when the Board specifies. These 
provisions do not refer, as Bennion supposes, to rights of 
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landowners that exist independently of th~ Board's pooling 
0 
orders. 
In short, Bennion's share of production originated 
with the forced pooling order of the Board. It did not exist, 
accrue or vest before the Board's order. Precisely the same is 
true of Bennion's one-eighth "landowner's royalty."* In as-
serting a "right" to production in kind before the effective 
date of the Board's pooling order, Bennion mistakes the source 
of his entitlement. The Oil and Gas Conservation Act is clear 
that Bennion had no such right to share in production before 
the effective date of the Board's order, which created and 
determined his share in the pool. 
Although it had no legal obligation to do so, there-
fore, Shell paid Bennion more than $72,000 as his share of pro-
duction receipts from the date of first production to the ef-
fective date of the pooling order. Shell made this payment 
voluntarily in an attempt to honor previous offers to Bennion, 
in an attempt to induce Bennion's cooperation, and in an at-
tempt to treat him fairly. But Shell is convinced, on the 
* Like the nonconsenting mineral owner's working interest 
share, his "landowner's royalty" originates with an order of 
the Board and does not accrue independently of proceedings be-
fore the Board. Subparagraph (h) of section 40-6-6 provides 
that "under a pooling order ... a non-consenting owner of a 
tract in a drilling unit ... shall be deemed to have a basic 
landowner's royalty of 1/8, or 12-1/2%, of the production allo-
cated to such tract." 
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basis of the foregoing statutes and other authorities, that it 
had no obligation to share with Bennion in the proceeds of 
production before the effective date of the Board's pooling 
order. Since it had no such obligation, it could hardly be 
saddled with the more severe obligation to pay Bennion in kind. 
B. It Would be Neither Just Nor Reasonable for 
Bennion to Receive Retroactive Payment in Kind 
The Board ordered Shell to pay Bennion his working 
interest in kind after July 26, 1979, the effective date of 
the pooling order. Bennion complains, in effect, that the 
Board's refusal to make this order retroactive to the time of 
first production was an abuse of discretion. The Board, how-
ever, is obligated to issue pooling orders on ''terms and condi-
tions that are just and reasonable." Utah Code Ann. 
§40-6-6(f) (1982 Repl. Vol.). Bennion's request for retroac-
tive payment in kind was neither just nor reasonable. 
Bennion argues, in effect, that he should receive the 
advantage of 1982 oil and gas prices for his share of produc-
tion beginning in 1974. Sheli and the other working interest 
owners, of course, obtained their share of production as pro-
duction occurred and at the lower prices that prevailed at that 
time. Bennion demands the advantage of increased oil prices 
even though he refused to undertake the risks of development 
along with the other working interest owners and even though he 
wait- ed years to obtain an order of the Board establishing his 
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interest. Indeed, Bennion waited seven years after Shell pro-
\ 
posed a cooperative agreement for drilling the unit and six and 
a half years after production began before he asked the Board 
to take action on his application for a forced pooling. During 
this entire period Shell was willing to share its production 
with Bennion on the same terms as to which the other working 
interest owners agreed. But Bennion refused to cooperate and 
to pay his share of development expenses -- not, we submit, 
merely because he was obstreperous. Rather he wished.to let 
the others risk their money in drilling the well which, if sue-
cessful, would benefit him. As the years passed and the price 
of oil and gas climbed dramatically through the mid-1970's, 
Bennion saw the opportunity to reap a windfall at the expense 
of the other working interest owners, by demanding payment of 
his alleged proportionate share in new oil and new gas. 
Bennion played a similar waiting game and made similar demands 
in at least ten other units in eastern Utah.* But the Board 
* Bennion made similar claims against Gulf Oil Corporation, as 
operator of ten other units in Duchesne County in which Bennion 
refused to pool his interest voluntarily. In those units, as 
in this case, Bennion waited for years to demand re-
troactively his share of production in kind. As in the present 
case, the Board refused Bennion's requests holding: "The ap-
plicant has failed to bring the present petition before the 
Board until several years after the drilling units were first 
initiated .... [A]pplicant had several opportunities to parti-
cipate in voluntary pooling arrangements on these properties. 
Failure to either petition the Board or take other action at an 
earlier date has jeopardized applicant's equitable position .... " 
Order in In re Bennion, Cause No. 139-18 (Jan. 24, 1980) at 4. 
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refused to let Bennion succeed here, as in those units, because 
. 
his failure to obtain a forced pooling order promptly at the 
outset of the well's development jeopardized his equitable 
position. 
Courts in other jurisdictions have uniformly rejected 
similar claims on the same equitable grounds. For example, the 
Nebraska Supreme Court in Baumgartner v. Gulf Oil Corp., 168 
N.W.2d 510, 518 (Neb. 1969), held: 
"Plaintiff was given every opportunity to secure 
his just and equitable share of the oil in the 
pool by being offered fair, reasonable and equit-
able participation with the other interested 
parties in [the unit]. He refused to participate 
as he had every right to do. As an oil operator 
we must assume that he was fully aware of the 
consequences of his refusal. While we agree he 
had a perfect right to refuse to join the pro-
ject, he should not be rewarded because he did. 
Neither should he be permitted to recover what he 
would have received if he had assumed the risks 
.of the project. To hold either way would serve 
to defeat the purpose of our conservation act . . 
" 
Accord: Desormeaux v. Inexco Oil Corp., supra; Superior Oil 
Co. v. Humble Oil & Rfg. Co., 165 So.2d 905, 910-11 (La. App. 
1964); Anderson v. Corporation Comm'n, 327 P.2d 699, 702 
(Okla. 1958); Wood Oil Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, supra, 239 
P.2d at 1026. See also United Petroleum Exploration, Inc. v. 
Premier Resources, Ltd., 511 F.Supp. 127, 131 (W.D. Okla. 
1980). 
Bennion relies upon two cases for the proposition that 
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he is entitled to production in kind from the date of first 
. 
production. Neither case, however, supports Bennion's posi-
tion; in fact both cases demonstrate its legal.and equitable 
flaws. In the first of those cases, Ward v. Corporation 
Comm'n, 501 P.2d 503 (Okla. 1972), the court held that a non-
drilling owner was entitled to participate in the proceeds of 
production, but only back to the date upon which the adminis-
trative agency's spacing order was issued. (Under an Oklahoma 
statute, the statutory royalty is pooled as of the date of the 
spacing order.) Since the subject well produced for months 
before the spacing order was entered, the Ward court in ef-
feet affirmed an order denying the type of relief that Bennion 
seeks here. More importantly, the nonconsenting owner in Ward 
did not seek production in kind, and the court's decision had 
nothing to do with that issue. 
In the other case Bennion cites, In re Application of 
Farmers Irrigation District, 194 N.W.2d 788 (Neb. 1972), the 
Nebraska court held that a pooling order was correctly made 
retroactive to the date of first production from the well. The 
court, however, was careful to limit its ruling to avoid exact-
ly the type of claim that Bennion now makes. At the close of 
its opinion the court in Farmers Irrigation District stated: 
''We do not mean to say that this [i.e. retroac-
tive pooling] should be done in every instance. 
All pertinent factors affecting the particular 
case under review must be considered. There is 
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ordinarily no good reason why an adjoining owner 
should not ask for a voluntary pooling agreement 
at the time his neighbor starts to drill and 
thereby share in the expense, as well as in pro-
duction, whether or not the well proves success-
ful. The statutes clearly intend that rights 
shall be resolved upon an equitable basis. To 
permit an adjoining owner to sit back and await 
the successful outcome of drilling operations 
without asking for a pooling agreement would 
place the entire risk and the entire expense upon 
the party drilling in the event of an unsuccess 
ful operation. This would ordinarily be in-
equitable and not justify a retroactive order. 
[The Nebraska statute comparable to section 
40-6-6] contemplates that when an adjoining owner 
fails to enter into a voluntary pooling agree-
ment, a spacing and pooling order may be entered 
on the application of any interested party. The 
drilling party may recover the share of the ex-
pense allocated to the adjoining owner by deduct-
ing it from the adjoining owner's share of the 
oil or gas produced. This enhances the risk 
taken by the drilling party who may encounter a 
dry well and is a factor which must also be con-
sidered in weighing equities." (Emphasis added.) 
194 N.W. 2d at 792. Bennion not only "sat back and awaited the 
successful outcome of drilling operations;" he has also awaited 
the escalation of oil and gas prices so as to press a claim for 
payment in kind at the most advantageous moment. Significant-
ly, the landowner in Farmers Irrigation District was not per-
mitted to share production in kind, but only the proceeds of 
production. See 194 N.W.2d at 789. 
Bennion, then, has given the Court no authority for 
his claims in this case. He has failed to show the Court a 
single instance in which a non-drilling mineral interest owner 
was permitted production in kind retroactively from the date of 
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first production. He has not advanced a single reason which, 
0 
in equity, would entitle him to that extraordinary relief. And 
he has most assuredly not shown that the Board~s decision was 
arbitrary or capricious. 
C. The Word "Production" in Section 40-6-6 
Does Not Entitle Bennion to Payment 
In Kind Back to First Production 
Bennion asserts (at page 11 of his brief) that section 
40-6-6(g)'s use of the phrase "share of production" signifies a 
legislative "mandate" that the Board's pooling orders must 
grant nonconsenting owners a share of oil and gas in kind and 
forecloses the Board from ordering such owners to share in the 
cash proceeds of production. Bennion's interpretation of the 
statute is wrong because he has an incorrect conception of the 
meaning of the word "production." Bennion's interpretation of 
the statute, moreover, would defeat the essential goals of the 
Oil and Gas Conservation Act. 
In the first place, "production" does not always or 
even usually mean "product." The word "production" is often 
used to refer to the value of production or the process of pro-
ducing. Thus "production taxes" (a term frequently used to 
denote taxes like the Utah mining occupation tax, the Utah oil 
and gas conservation gas, or the Utah ad valorem tax) refers 
to taxes based on the value of production. See, ~· 15 
U.S.C. §3320(a) (providing for producer reimbursement of sever-
ance, production or similar taxes levied on "production of 
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natural gas"). Section 40-6-6(g) itself contemplates exactly 
this use of the term "production" by requ'iring costs of surface 
equipment, drilling and operation to be subtracted "from the 
nonconsenting owner's share of production." Bennion's own law-
yers use "production" in this sense when they tell the Court: 
"[T]he issue before this Court is not whether or not Mr. 
Bennion is entitled to receive production prior to the date of 
the entry of the pooling order ... but rather whether or not he 
is entitled to receive production in kind." (Appellant's 
Brief at 8). In short, the word "production" does not neces-
sarily mean ''product" unless the qualifying words "in kind" are 
added. 
In the second place, the Oil and Gas Conservation 
Act's essential goal of inducing owners to agree promptly with 
operators as to the division of costs and production would be 
frustrated if the Board had no choice but to require retroac-
tive sharing of production in kind in its pooling orders. If 
this were the rule, every owner would (like Bennion) simply 
.refuse to risk his money for drilling costs, would wait until 
the operator completed a successful well, and would continue to 
wait until the price of oil increased, before approaching the 
Board for a pooling order. The Oil and Gas Conservation Act 
cannot be interpreted in a way that rewards owners for refusing 
to comply with the Act. This was the point of the Nebraska 
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court's decision in In re Application of Farmers Irrigation 
District, supra, cited by Bennion in support of his position. 
D. The Board's Order Does Not Violate B.ennion' s 
Right to "Possess and Protect Property" 
With no pertinent authority to support him, Bennion 
makes the sweeping charge that the Board's order denies him the 
right to "possess and protect property" guaranteed in Article 
I, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution. Significantly, Bennion 
does not contend that he has been insufficiently compensated 
for his share of oil and gas production for periods before the 
effective date of the Board's pooling order. Rather he argues 
that the Board's refusal to award him retroactive payment in 
kind denied him the "liberty to contract with others respecting 
the use to which he may subject his property." (Appellant's 
Brief at 17-18). 
The first problem with this contention is that Bennion 
never raised this argument in the District Court or before the 
Board, but raises it for the first time on appeal. The general 
rule in this jurisdiction is, of course, that "matters not 
raised in the trial court will not be considered on appeal." 
Chumney v. Stott, 14 Utah 2d 202, 203-04, 381 P.2d 84, 86 
(1963). There is reason to depart from that rule in the pre-
sent case. 
More fundamentally, the Board deprived Bennion of 
nothing; certainly the Board did not prevent him from entering 
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into whatever contracts he wished for the ~ale of his propor-
0 
tionate share of oil and gas from Shell's well. If Bennion 
wished to take his oil and gas in kind and to .~ell it as it was 
produced, he had only to do one of two things. First, he could 
have entered into an operating agreement with Shell and the 
other working interest owners before production began. In this 
connection, the December 14, 1973 operating agreement executed 
by those other working interest owners inequivocally gave each 
party the right to take oil and gas in kind. (Shell Ex. 8 at 
6). Second, Bennion could have obtained a forced pooling order 
from the Board, thus establishing his interest in the unit, 
before production began or at least during the early years of 
production. But Bennion availed himself of neither option. If 
anyone deprived Bennion of the opportunity to sell "his" oil 
and gas, .that person was Bennion himself. 
Perhaps the simplest answer to Bennion's constitution-
al claim is that Bennion received the full cash value of his 
alleged share of production from the first day of production, 
that is, $72,222.41. In receiving the full cash value of his 
alleged share, Bennion has already received more than he is 
entitled to receive under the provisions of section 40-6-6 and 
proportionately more than Shell and the other working interest 
owners received. Without taking any of the risk borne by Shell 
and the others, Bennion has nevertheless been paid not only his 
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net share of revenue but a one-eighth royalty for production up 
0 
to the payout date -- a royalty that the other working interest 
owners had no right to receive. Under these circumstances, 
Bennion cannot rationally complain that he has been deprived of 
any property right. 
III. 
THE OIL AND GAS CONSERVATION ACT REQUIRES 
BENNION TO PAY HIS PROPORTIONATE SHARE 
OF THE WELL'S EXPENSE 
As the Board's calculation- of Bennion's royalty ac-
cumulations shows (Order of April 30, 1981 at 5), no costs were 
deducted from his 12-1/2 percent royalty computed on production 
until the well's payout. As to production after payout, 
Bennion received 100 percent of his working interest share of 
proceeds less his proportionate share of drilling and operating 
expenses. Bennion complains that the Board erred in subtract-
ing these expenses from his working interest share of pro-
ceeds. He argues that his statutory royalty is not "cost free" 
if expenses incurred before payout are deducted from his work-
ing interest accumulation. 
The Board subtracted a portion of the drilling and 
operating costs from Bennion's working interest share of pro-
ceeds because the Oil and Gas Conservation Act required it to 
do so. The last sentence of the current section 40-6-6(g) re-
quires, as part of each pooling order, that the nonconsenting 
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owner's share of production be diminished py an amount equal to 
(1) 100 percent of his share of surface equipment and operating 
costs from first production, and (2) up to 150 .. percent of his 
share of the costs of wellsite preparation, drilling, testing, 
completing and reworking the well. The pre-1977 version of the 
same statute required a similar deduction, but in less detail. 
Thus the superseded version of section 40-6-6(g) provided: 
"The order shall determine the interest of each 
owner in the unit, and may provide in substance 
that ... as to each owner who does not agree, he 
shall be entitled to receive from the person ... 
drilling and operating the well on the unit his 
share of the production applicable to his inter-
est, after the person or persons drilling and 
operating said well have recovered the share of 
the cost of drilling and operating applicable to 
such nonconsenting owner's interest plus a rea-
sonable charge for supervision and storage." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Bennion therefore incorrectly supposes that the pre-
1977 statute does not require subtraction of his share of ex-
penses. The Court need not decide whether the old or new 
statute applies here, for both versions require subtraction of 
at least 100 percent of the portion of expenses attributable 
to Bennion's working interest. 
IV. 
BENNION IS NOT ENTITLED TO PREJUDGMENT INTEREST 
ON HIS WORKING INTEREST ACCOUNT 
Bennion claims Shell should have been required to pay 
him, in effect, prejudgment interest on his $57,887.93 working 
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interest accumulation. He argues that since the Board awarded 
~ 
him interest on his royalty accumulations, it should have 
treated his working interest the same. 
In Utah, prejudgment interest is awarded as "damages 
due to the opposing party's delay in tendering the amount owing 
under an obligation." L&A Drywall, Inc. v. Whitmore Construe-
tion Co., 608 P.2d 626, 629 (Utah 1980). Bennion had no right 
to share in the proceeds of production -- and Shell had no 
obligation to pay Bennion such proceeds -- until the Board 
entered its interim pooling order of March 26, 1980. (See dis-
cussion in Part IIA of this argument.) Since Shell deposited 
Bennion's working interest accumulations in an interest-bearing 
account for Bennion's benefit immediately after the issuance of 
the March 1980 interim order, he cannot logically claim inter-
est on an antecedent debt. In short, Shell had no obligation 
to pay Bennion his working interest prior to the time when 
Shell in fact paid him the full sum determined by the Board. 
As to why the Board treated Bennion's royalty and 
working interest differently for purposes of accruing interest, 
we need only point out that the Board has historically viewed 
royalty as an obligation preexisting its own pooling orders. 
As demonstrated by the Board's decision in In re Bennion, 
Cause No. 139-18 (a copy of which appears as Appendix No. 8 to 
Bennion's brief), the Board is of the view that the landowner's 
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right to a royalty exists irrespective of any action that the 
0 
Board might take, while his right to a ful1 working interest is 
entirely dependent upon the entry of a pooling ·order. Although 
Shell does not agree with the Board's analysis of the Oil and 
Gas Conservation Act in this regard (see discussion at page 15 
and accompanying note, supra), it explains the reason why the 
Board refused Bennion interest on his working interest accumu-
lations.* Significantly, both Shell and the Board agree that 
since Shell had no obligation to pay Bennion his working inter-
est until the interim pooling order was entered herein, it had 
no obligation to pay interest on those accumulations prior to 
the entry of that order. 
v. 
THE BOARD CORRECTLY REFUSED TO REQUIRE SHELL 
TO TRANSPORT ITS RECORDS TO SALT LAKE CITY 
Bennion's final and most remarkable contention in this 
appeal is that the Board should have required Shell to trans-
port its well records from Houston, Texas, where they are kept 
and continuously used, to his lawyer's office in Salt Lake 
* In In re Malnar, Cause No. 131-26 (Sept. 17, 1975), the 
Board did not award interest on the applicant's working inter-
est accoun-t~as Bennion contends. At page 3 of the Board's 
' . . ' order in that case (reproduced as Appendix 6 to Bennion s 
brief), the Board stated that interest would only be applied to 
the applicant's royalty. In re Armstrong, Cause No. 140-8 
(Sept. 14, 1975), which Bennion also cites, invol~ed nei~her 
royalties or working interest, and is completely inapposite. 
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City. This contention is remarkable becau~e Bennion offers no 
plausible explanation (1) why his Houston accountants did not 
perform an adequate audit of Shell's records in. Houston, where 
they were given full access to those records, (2) why the 
voluminous accounting records already provided Bennion's coun-
sel did not apprise him of the facts he requires, and (3) why, 
if Bennion was dissatisfied with his Houston accountants, he 
did not take advantage of the Board's order that Shell pay the 
expenses of his lawyer, his Salt Lake City accountant and of 
Bennion himself, to travel to Houston to review Shell's records 
in person. Nor does Bennion suggest a single reason why his 
desire to look at Shell's records in Salt Lake City would out-
weigh the enormous inconvenience to Shell of sending its work-
ing files to Salt Lake City.* 
Bennion argues that he was treated unfairly because he 
was "compelled to employ accountants he was unfamiliar with" 
and because all of the well's records were not "available" to 
* Shell's accounting supervisor testified before the Board 
that Shell's original cost documents (invoices, drop tickets, 
etc.) are not maintained on a well basis, but are maintained on 
a chronological basis in one of two locations in Houston, de-
pending on the age of the document. (Tr. of Dec. 18, 1980 at 
19-20). Revenue records are located in another facility in 
Houstin (id. at 26), and are likewise maintained on a chrono-
logical basis rather than a well basis (id. at 29). Shell 
codes all such data with well designations, which enables Shell 
to produce computer summaries of revenue and expense on a well 
basis. Shell Ex. 23 is this type of summary. 
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those accountants. (Appellant's Brief at 23). Neither Shell 
nor the Board, however, compelled Bennion°to hire anyone; the 
identity of his accountants is his affair. The accountants he 
hired, moreover, had unrestricted access to Shell's records and 
the assistance of Shell's accounting staff to perform their 
audit. Shell's accounting supervisor testified to the Board 
that Bennion's audit team received Shell's full cooperation. 
(Tr. of Dec. 18, 1980 at 25-27). During Bennion's Houston 
audit, one set of allocation records was not readily available, 
but Shell retrieved the records and notified Bennion's audi-
tors that they were available. His auditors, however, never 
returned to review them. (Id. at 26-27). The only "evidence" 
before the Board of the alleged inadequacy of Shell's account-
ing was a statement by Bennion's counsel. Asked whether 
Bennion believed there was a discrepancy between Shell's sum-
maries and the audit report prepared by Bennion's accountants, 
Mr. Stirba replied: 
"The only think I can say about that ... is this 
is what we got from [Bennion's accountants] and 
... it is by and large unsatisfactory. There are 
some aspects of this accounting which may very 
well be unsatisfactory because of the performance 
of the gentlemen who performed the audit, but 
there are also indications, at least in this, 
that there were certain documents they couldn't 
get. So far as a huge discrepancy, quite frank-
ly, I would have to say, "No," but based upon 
this information, it's not very easy for us to 
ascertain exactly what these gentlemen are say-
ing." 
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(Id. at 34-35). 
s 
Neither the "unsatisfactory performance" of Bennion's 
chosen accountants nor his problems in communi~ating with them, 
need concern this Court. Bennion had the opportunity to exa-
mine Shell's records; regardless whether he took full advantage 
of that opportunity, no purpose would be served now in requir-
ing Shell to deliver its records to Salt Lake City. Although 
courts and administrative bodies usually have the discretion to 
specify the place for the examination of a party's records, the 
general rule is that inspection should take place at the pro-
ducing party's office during regular business hours "so as to 
interfere as little as possible with the carrying on of the 
producing party's business operations." 83 A.L.R. 2d 309 
(1963). See also 23 Am. Jur. 2d, Deposition and Discovery 
§298 (1965); 27 C.J.S. Discovery §82 (1959); Mid-American 
Facilities, Inc. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 78 F.R.D. 497 (E.D. 
Wisc. 1978); Beryl v. U.S. Smelting, Rfg. & Mining Co., 34 
Misc.2d 382, 228 N.Y.S.2d 394 (1962). The Board made every 
effort to assist Bennion in examining Shell's records, and this 
Court cannot second-guess the Board without some showing of 
extraordinary need on Bennion's part. The Board's order was in 
this respect perfectly reasonable. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Bennion has tried to take unfair advantage of 
every effort of Shell and the Board to resolve this dispute. 
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His claim for production in ~ind from the date of first produc-
tion would give him a huge bonus for shirking the risks of ex-
ploration and drilling--risks undertaken by Shell and six other 
mineral interest owners in the unit. Utah law provides no 
basis for his claims, and he has failed to demonstrate that the 
Board acted arbitrarily or capriciously in any respect. The 
judgment of the District Court dismissing Bennion's claims 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this {gi'\-.. day of j~~~l)-'~~ 
1982. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
By {)D_t.~· 
Alan L. Sullivan 
Paul M. Durham 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
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